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Comments on Longworth and Weber discussion 
 
As Francis Longworth discusses, HC&UT argues that there is no such thing as the causal 
relation nor a handful of causal relations nor even a truck load. Rather, there is only a 
seemingly endless array of relations, called ‘thick’ relations in the book, that may be loosely 
grouped under the label ‘causal’, with a vast variety of different clusterings for different 
purposes. So I do not see Hitchcock’s question as posing an objection. Once we have 
served our purpose by labelling a relation ‘causal’, there may well be nothing added, helpful 
to this purpose, by noting further that the relation is one of feeding gasoline to the carburettor 
rather than, say, stuffing it in or making it available. For instance, if our purpose is to predict 
how probabilistic changes propagate across a set of quantities supposing the probability of 
one is changed ‘surgically’, this purpose is served once we can point to the probability-
change-making relations among these quantities and label them as ‘causal’ in the Bayes-
nets sense. 
 
My purpose in labelling a very great many relations as ‘causal’ is to counter current-day 
‘Humeans’, like David Lewis, John Earman and Bas van Fraassen. These philosophers are 
enamoured of some one or another special set of features in nature, features that are 
conceived of as ‘inert’, ‘non-active’, ‘temporally and spatially local’ or whatever. A great many 
features I see around me – and that appear to be essential in every successful scientific 
intervention I have studied – are missing from their special sets. These philosophers – the 
‘Humeans’ – are the ones who make the causal/non-causal distinction, with their favoured 
concepts labelled ‘non-causal’. In maintaining that pushing, pinching, compressing, repelling, 
attracting and so forth are causal, I imply that these are not among the favoured sets of the 
Humeans and they are not reducible to features in these sets. And of course I also maintain 
that they are every bit as much in the world, and play as great a role in real science, as the 
‘non-causal’ features the Humeans admire.  
 
So, thick descriptions of relations labelled ‘causal’ need not be causal-content increasing. 
Indeed they can be causal-content decreasing. Consider ‘the pesticide smothers eel worms’, 
which is a possible thick description for an arrow in a causal-Bayes-net of Judea Pearl 
representing ‘the pesticide causes eelworm death’. The arrow is appropriate only if 
smothering is part of a set of relations that together satisfy the Bayes-nets axioms. But being 
part of such a set is not implied by ‘smothers’. This fact may make trouble for Longworth’s 
own proposal, assuming, as I would, that being correctly representable by a causal-Bayes-
net arrow should be among Longworth’s right-hand-side disjuncts.  
 
I hope that Longworth can steer around this kind of problem, however, because the scheme 
he offers can make causality a far more useful concept than I fear it to be. Consider: If thick 
descriptions are not composites of ‘causes’ plus some non-causal description there may well 
be criteria for the application of the thick label that don’t include the characterizing features 
pointed to in labelling the relation ‘causal’. If in turn the thick description implies these 
features, we then have an independent way to identify when these features obtain. This is a 
powerful tool. Consider for instance how useful it would be to have independently accessible 
criteria for when a set of relations satisfies the Bayes-nets axioms or transmits a mark or 
reliably produces a targeted outcome. 
 
The possibility of inferring from thick descriptions to ‘causes’ is independent of the other half 
of Longworth’s scheme, which takes causality to be analysable as a (possibly very long) 
disjunction. Here I have a weaker view: Family resemblance is the best we can hope for.1 
Nor do I see why we need the stronger claim. If the upward implications from thick 
descriptions to features characterizing causal laws work, Longworth’s answer to Hitchcock 
goes through whether or not a proper ‘if-and-only-if’ can be provided. And, as I just argued, 
                                                          
1 Hence I don’t really hold with Longworth’s interpretation (iii) of me. 
the upwards implications would be a boon whether or not Hitchcock’s question raises 
problems for my claims about thick relations. 
 
With respect to ‘if and only if’, I think there’s no point in doing it unless it can be done 
properly. There I’m sceptical. Hall’s two concepts are not two concepts but two loose 
groupings, as are the labels in Longworth’s (DTC1). Consider just the probabilistic theory of 
causality. HC&UT argues that the correct expression of it depends on the exact form of the 
causal-probabilistic laws at work as well as a variety of facts about the population. Nor 
should this be surprising. Causation is a concept from ordinary life – what Otto Neurath 
called a ‘ballungen’ concept:2 a vague, rough-edged congestion of ideas and criteria that 
serves a lot of different purposes at once and often none of them very precisely. As Stuart 
Hampshire maintained, such concepts should not be subject to more rigour than they can 
bear.  
 
Yet to figure in science they must be rigorous. Even narrowing consideration to scientific 
contexts, though, I would not expect ‘if-and-only-if’ to be possible. As Sophia Efstathiou 
stresses,3 when ordinary concepts are brought into science they get transformed and 
transformed into concepts that do different but very specific jobs in different sciences in 
different ways. Quantum field theory requires a different concept of causation than bicycle 
makers do, which is different again from concepts needed in various social sciences. Even 
within economics a number of different concepts are available, and useful, as HC&UT 
illustrates. There’s no reason to think that this array of scientifically-transformed causal 
concepts is finite or fixed or has any system to it. 
 
As to Weber’s comments, I agree with all, except his interpretation of me and his enthusiasm 
for IARC. I am less enthusiastic not because I advocate less diversity, but more. My 
distinction between methods that clinch conclusions and those that merely vouch for them is 
part of a larger study of evidence-ranking and conclusion-grading schemes.4 There is now 
an array of these, all looking much like IARC’s, though often less nuanced. I argue that we 
need accounts of 1)the quality of evidence – how likely is the evidence claim to be true, 
2)relevance – in what ways and how strongly does it bear on the conclusion, and 3)how to 
evaluate conclusions in light of all evidence. Most guides focus on 1), ignore 2)5 and give 
flawed advice about 3).  
 
In IARC we see 1) in the assessment of individual studies (“Each [epidemiological] study is 
assessed according to three criteria….”; for experimental animals, “Conclusion (1) is drawn if 
there are high quality studies…”).6  3) is done in two steps: First assign sufficient, limited, 
inadequate or lack labels for each of the three categories (epidemiological, animal studies, 
mechanistic); second, draw the conclusion labelled ‘group x’ according to the rules Weber 
sketches. So we can conclude “carcinogenic to humans” if there is sufficient epidemiological 
evidence for carcinogenicity in humans and we can conclude this if “a positive relationship 
has been observed in studies in which chance, bias and confounding could be ruled out with 
reasonable confidence.” Thus unbiased, etc. epidemiological studies trump the rest: Positive 
results from these yield a positive conclusion even if evidence from the other modes is 
inadequate or negative.  
                                                          
2 For further discussion of this see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel (l996). 
3 See Efstathiou (2009) on what she calls ‘founded’ concepts. 
4 See my website (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/cartwrig/Default.htm) for my own papers on these topics and 
references therein to others. 
5 For instance, relevance, as opposed to quality and methods for drawing overall conclusions, is not explicitly 
addressed in the IARC scheme. But looking at the scheme, as Weber describes it, it appears that the relevance of 
positive epidemiological results on some human population to ‘is carcinogenic to humans’ is taken for granted (I 
think fallaciously), whereas the relevance of animal results requires a hypothesis about shared mechanisms. 
6 IARC (2006). 
 
Why? The only sensible reason I have come up with is that of chapter I.3: These unbiased 
(etc.) studies are clinchers – given the background assumptions,7 a probabilistic difference 
in the occurrence of cancer between exposed and unexposed groups deductively implies 
that the agent caused cancer in the study population.8 The importance of discussing 
clinching is not, as Weber suggests, to argue that a single study is sufficient but the reverse. 
Why prefer these studies? ‘Because they are unbiased (etc.)’. What’s so good about that? In 
the end, I take it, the answer is that lack of bias (etc.) is enough to guarantee the conclusion. 
But now it is hard to see why these studies trump others. Deductive conclusions are only as 
sure as their premises. Premises are never certain.9 So the conclusions aren’t either. We 
give a good shot at ensuring the premises. But why have more confidence that we have 
succeeded than we have in arguments that may have equally – or even more – secure 
premises but not such a tight fit between premises and conclusion? From this perspective 
the most sensible procedure seems to be to look at all the studies together and give an 
overall evaluation, as best possible, not to suppose that following a recipe to reduce bias 
(etc) will always produce more reliable results than studies that rely on mechanisms or 
animal models or even statistical studies with some bias. 
 
Weber also takes my connection between types of systems or types of conclusions on the 
one hand and types of evidence on the other to suggest conclusions be drawn from one type 
of study alone. In a sense I maintain the reverse. All methods require background 
assumptions; when the assumptions fail, the methods cannot be taken to be reliable. Yet we 
often cannot tell whether the assumptions are met or not. It is good practice then to multiply 
studies in order to control for error in assumptions, and in the end to make an overall 
judgment based on the pattern of results.  
 
Beware though. The reliability of method depends on the type of conclusion drawn. So 
Weber’s concern that differentiating kinds of conclusions, as I insist we must, restricts the 
methods we can use to test them, is a correct one. Indeed it is one of the central lessons I 
urge, and one of great practical significance. We need to be clear about exactly what kind of 
causal conclusion we are entitled to draw from our studies; and not out of philosophical 
purity but because the inferences we can go on to draw as we imbed that conclusion in other 
contexts, combining it with other knowledge, depend intimately on what causal claim we 
have established in the first place. Indeed, this is one of my worries about current causal 
investigations in the biomedical and social sciences: They are often sloppy about what the 
causal conclusion drawn claims.10 
 
What then of the scatter of methods Weber describes from IARC – epidemiological studies, 
studies on model animals, studies of mechanisms? These can properly be used in a 
complex inference to establish not causal laws (which in my account are always population-
specific) but more abstract capacity claims: claims about a stable contribution the cause can 
make. It is a complicated story about what is involved in a capacity claim and how such 
claims can be justified.11 But epidemiological methods and studies of mechanisms can play 
an important role. 
                                                          
7 Including common assumptions about the relation between causes and probabilities as well as the context-local 
assumptions that the two groups have the same distribution of other causally relevant features (unbiased) and 
that there is a genuine probabilistic difference in outcome (the difference in frequency is not a result of chance). 
8 That’s because, given the assumptions, the only possible explanation for the difference is that the agent caused 
cancers in some members of the exposed population. 
9 Including the broad metaphysical premise required in these arguments, which I discuss in HC&UT, that every 
probabilistic difference requires a causal explanation. 
10 Sometimes this is ‘remedied’ by reporting precise statistical results. This can be an even worse practice since 
these results are often only useful when interpreted causally – and that is the interpretation they are given. But in 
this case the causal interpretation, being less explicit, is even less rigorously reviewed. 
11 For further discussion see Cartwright (2007) and (1989) and articles on my website on causal powers.  
 
Finally, Weber urges attention to simulations and experiments in economics. We are again 
here in agreement: This is an important topic. I discuss only thought experiments, in a 
chapter on ‘idealized’ models, though many of the cautions about ‘overconstraining’ 
restrictions in the set-ups apply to actual experiments as well. Other than that, I leave 
experiments and simulations to other colleagues, including Weber himself, who have more 
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